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a b s t r a c t
The conceptual underpinnings for adaptive management are simple; there will always be inherent
uncertainty and unpredictability in the dynamics and behavior of complex ecological systems as a result
non-linear interactions among components and emergence, yet management decisions must still be
made. The strength of adaptive management is in the recognition and confrontation of such uncertainty.
Rather than ignore uncertainty, or use it to preclude management actions, adaptive management can
foster resilience and flexibility to cope with an uncertain future, and develop safe to fail management
approaches that acknowledge inevitable changes and surprises. Since its initial introduction, adaptive
management has been hailed as a solution to endless trial and error approaches to complex natural
resource management challenges. However, its implementation has failed more often than not. It does
not produce easy answers, and it is appropriate in only a subset of natural resource management
problems. Clearly adaptive management has great potential when applied appropriately. Just as clearly
adaptive management has seemingly failed to live up to its high expectations. Why? We outline nine
pathologies and challenges that can lead to failure in adaptive management programs. We focus on
general sources of failures in adaptive management, so that others can avoid these pitfalls in the future.
Adaptive management can be a powerful and beneficial tool when applied correctly to appropriate
management problems; the challenge is to keep the concept of adaptive management from being
hijacked for inappropriate use.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
Adaptive management is natural resource management con-
ducted in a manner that purposely and explicitly increases
knowledge (enhances learning) and decreases uncertainty (Holling,
1978; Walters, 1986; Williams et al., 2009) while allowing
management to proceed despite the uncertainty present. Adaptive
management uses management actions as experiments to provide
data supporting, or failing to support, competing hypotheses
when there is uncertainty regarding the response of ecological
systems to management activities, to better meet management
objectives over time. Adaptive management is a form of structured
decision making, and structured decision making and adaptive
management are often used synonymously in natural resource
management. Adaptive management as originally envisioned by
Holling (1978) and Walters (1986) is now more precisely termed
active adaptive management. The differences between structured
decisionmaking, passive adaptivemanagement and active adaptive
management are discussed elsewhere in this volume of the Journal
of Environmental Management. Additionally, natural resource
decision making is conducted within the constraints of broader
social and political systems, which often confine or constrain the
ability to manage adaptively (or to manage at all, in some cases).
As a result, some authors define adaptive governance (sensu
Gunderson and Light, 2006) as the institutional framework that
deals with social and political dimensions of resource management
and that allows adaptive management to function. Policy may
directly influence management or may instead provide incentives
or disincentives to encourage desired outcomes.
Here we focus on what is now commonly referred to as active
adaptive management (Walters, 1986); however, the pathologies we
identifymaybepresent inother formsof adaptivemanagement, or in
any type of resource management, for that matter. Similarly, the
solutions are similar. Active adaptive management is appropriately
utilized when a natural resource is clearly in need of some manage-
ment action (i.e., in a perceived less than desirable state), manage-
ment actions are logistically, financially and politically feasible, but
the response of the resource to a particular management action is
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uncertain. Furthermore, because of different viewpoints, or biases,
coupled with uncertainty, different stakeholders or managers or
scientistsmayhavedifferent ideas regardinghowa system is likely to
respond tomanagement, and underlying this are diverse hypotheses
of cause and effect. Those competing hypotheses are then put at risk
by applying management experimentally. As an example, consider
a rare and declining species such as the least tern (Sternula anti-
llarum). There are several potential reasons why this species is
declining; most (but not all) managers accept that the decline is
related to a reduction in available habitat. But, habitat is a vague
concept and there is uncertainty regardingwhat habitat element has
been reduced for terns, andhowthatmightbe recoveredbypotential
management actions. Itmay be thatwoodyorherbaceous vegetation
is encroaching on tern habitat, it may be that some change in
habitat conditions increased populations of nest predators, or that
foraging habitat has declined, resulting in reduced survival of young.
More hypotheses are possible as well. An adaptive management
approach may first design concurrent replicated manipulations of
vegetation and predator populations to determine which, if any,
produces a positive response in tern populations. If habitat im-
provement by reducing herbaceous vegetation produces a positive
response, there is still uncertainty in how to best achieve the
manipulation of herbaceous vegetation while promoting a positive
response in tern populations. Is it best achieved by herbicide appli-
cation or by physically manipulating the environment with bull-
dozers? Or, is it best achieved by restoring spring pulse flows of
rivers?A seemingly simple natural resourcemanagementprobleme
howcanwe increasepopulationsof ternse canbeverycomplex (and
this is without considering the socio-political aspects of species and
habitat management). And in this example, questions of food avail-
ability for tern chicks have not been addressed.Norhave questions of
interactions andmulti-causalityor non-linearity,which are common
in ecological systems. This example also illustrates the need for
monitoring (of, for example, least tern reproduction, vegetation
dynamics, and forage fish populations), and an iterative approach to
management experiments designed to test the hypotheses of effect
forwarded by managers and stakeholders. Such an approach is not
trial and error, nor haphazard sequences of different management
options.
Since its initial introduction and description, adaptive man-
agement has been hailed as a solution to endless trial and error
approaches to complex natural resource management challenges.
However, its implementation has failed more often than not. It does
not produce easy answers, and it is appropriate in only a subset of
natural resource management problems. It is not a panacea for
the navigation of ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973;
Ludwig, 2001). Adaptive management is not possible, or needed,
in most situations (Gregory et al., 2006). Adaptive management
and related approaches are appropriatewhere both uncertainty and
controllability are high (Fig. 1). If uncertainty is high but controlla-
bility is low, scenarios are a more appropriate approach and allow
for the exploration of potential future outcomes of present actions
(Baron et al., 2009). Adaptive management is a poor fit for solving
problems of intricate complexity, high external influences, long
time spans, high structural uncertainty and with low confidence in
assessments (Gregory et al., 2006)(e.g., climate change). However,
even in such situations, adaptivemanagementmay be the preferred
alternative, and can be utilized to resolve or reduce structural
uncertainty, for example.
The implementation of adaptive management has proven to be
difficult. Despite attempts to integrate adaptive management into
land management in the United States (e.g., Williams et al., 2009),
Australia, and elsewhere, these programs are often adaptive
management programs in name only and never reach fruition or
meet expectation (Allan and Curtis, 2005). The reasons for failure
as assessed by others include: 1), the failure of scientists to under-
stand the array of management possible or to recognize the need to
provide information that can be directly used by decision makers
(Gregory et al., 2006); 2), the failure of decision makers
to understand why adaptive management is needed (Walters,
2007); 3), the failure by overlapping management agencies to
clearly define their responsibilities for implementing an adaptive
management plan (Gregory et al., 2006); 4), an agency belief
that single best policies lend credibility (Walters, 1997); 5), a lack
of leadership for the complex process of implementing an adaptive
approach (Walters, 2007); 6), the hijacking of management goals
for research interests (Walters, 1997); 7), using bureaucratic and
political inaction as a policy choice (Walters, 1997); 8), a lack of
emphasis or attention to the processes required for building shared
understanding and shared decision making among diverse stake-
holders (Gregory et al., 2006); 9), the tendency among scientists
to overstate their capability to measure complex functional rela-
tionships through experimentation (Gregory et al., 2006; p. 2413);
10), valuing actionmore than learning (Lee,1999); 11), difficulties in
translating learning into practice (Lee, 1999); 12), the cost and
delays associated with gathering information and learning (Lee,
1999); 13), uncertainty in whether the adaptive management
approach works (Lee, 1999); and 14), inadequate funding for
the increased monitoring needed to successfully compare the
outcomes of alternative policies (Walters, 2007). Adaptive
management experiments that entail long time frames and large
areas have not been carried out in many systems because of high
perceived costs (Walters, 1997; Moir and Block, 2001). Other
programmatic failures can be attributed to the unwillingness of
managers to risk experimentationwith rare or vulnerable resources
(Feldman, 2008).
Clearly adaptive management has great potential when applied
to appropriate problems. Just as clearly adaptive management
has frequently failed to live up to its high expectations. Why?
Here we discuss nine pathologies and challenges that can lead to
failure in adaptive management programs. These challenges exist
in adaptive management programs in the United States and may
be unique to that setting. The United States is characterized by
large and powerful bureaucracies charged with natural resource
management; stakeholders with different values and objectives,
motivation and resources; a strong legal institutionwhich has been
the arena of resolution of many environmental issues; and a frag-
mentation of environmental research and practice in many areas.
We focus on general sources of failures in adaptive management,
Fig. 1. Adaptive management and scenarios are complementary approaches to
understanding complex systems. Adaptive management functions best when both
uncertainty and controllability are high, which means the potential for learning is high,
and the system can be manipulated (adapted from Peterson et al., 2003).
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so that others can avoid these pitfalls in the future. We believe
that adaptive management can be a powerful and beneficial tool
when applied correctly to appropriate problems. We have identi-
fied nine pathologies in the implementation of adaptive manage-
ment, which represent broad and commonly repeated sources of
failure; they are listed and discussed below.
2. Pathologies in adaptive management
2.1. Lack of stakeholder engagement
A lack of engagement of stakeholders early in the adaptive
management process can lead to stakeholders rejecting results that
vary from their expectations. Similarly, failure to include crucial
stakeholders, because of accident or malice, can have similar
results. Managers of natural resources are often dealing with
management decisions that are contentious. Contention may arise
from the rarity of a resource, or because different resource users
have very disparate views on the best uses or management of
a specific resource. Resource managers must make management
decisions regardless of uncertainty and in the face of differing
stakeholder values and objectives. Managers, however, often lack
training in social sciences, including facilitation. Rather than
engage stakeholders in complex and potentially protracted nego-
tiation towards formalization of the disparate hypotheses of
response to management underlying stakeholders differing
worldviews, managers may attempt to anticipate users’ viewpoints.
Government agencies often hold sway among stakeholders in
complex regional scale adaptive management processes. They are
often the legally empowered, technically astute and the primary
funders of much of the adaptive management actions. Agency
personnel are charged with designing research, monitoring and
evaluation. A challenge in adaptive management is the recognition
by key agency personnel that they will have to become engaged in
activities that are outside their own agency mandate, and that they
may have to agree to involvement from parties who are affected by
their management decisions but have no legal authority. Bridging
this legal gap is a challenge. The Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) is a statute that guides the way in which citizens and other
entities can become engaged with agencies. How federal agencies
choose to apply this law can be either a barrier or bridge to adaptive
management. The Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Program is
an example of such a FACA committee. When former Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt established the program, he made sure
the rules of FACA were followed to legitimize the group activity,
even though its role is as an advisory group to the Secretary.
The process of stakeholder engagement is critically important
for adaptive management. Adaptive management as originally
envisioned (Holling, 1978; Walters, 1986) was developed to bridge
interdisciplinary gaps among scientists and managers. That is, it
involved the development of computer models as tools for trans-
lating scientific understanding and jargon into a common frame-
work. The computer model as such was a tool for communicating
among a smaller subset of technical specialists rather than a larger
group of politically and socially engaged stakeholders. By the early
1990’s some scholars (Lee, 1993; Gunderson et al., 1995) recognized
that the social and political dimensions that accompany stake-
holder involvement were different from the type of scientific
community from which adaptive management arose. As a result,
developments such as collaborative adaptive management
emerged, which was developed to bring together the scientific
strengths of adaptive management with the lessons from collabo-
rative management. This blend was adopted in the formation of the
adaptive management program in Glen Canyon in the late 1990’s.
The Glen Canyon program developed a series of protocols about
how the group operates and used a facilitator to moderate the
group meetings. Recent evaluations (Susskind et al., 2010)
have suggested that for various reasons, the collaborative processes
have either failed to change policies or to resolve unclear mandates.
Failures in collaboration can limit and impede the ability to
conduct adaptivemanagement experiments, a barrier that has been
recognized for a long time (Lee, 1993; Gunderson et al., 1995;
Walters, 1986, 1997).
2.2. Experiments are difficult
Several of the more well-known examples of adaptive
management in the United States have focused on systems that are
extremely large, are slow to respond to any intervention, and occur
at temporal and spatial scales where replication is not possible. This
includes attempts to restore the Everglades in Florida, The Colorado
River in the American Southwest, the Columbia River in the Pacific
Northwest and the Platte River in Nebraska. In addition to problems
inherent in managing systems at such large scales, the cross-
jurisdictional nature of such large ecological systems seems to yield
governance structures that are similarly large and complicated.
Such governance can fail, because it may be in a specific stake-
holder’s best interest to not undertake experimental actions that
would help sort among alternative hypotheses of causation under
consideration, or to misdirect attention from relevant hypotheses
(e.g., sea lion predation of salmon at the mouth of the Columbia
River as the primary hypothesis for salmon decline).
The reluctance to experiment can also be manifest as a need for
control (Allan and Curtis, 2005) from a range of stakeholders
including agencies. This need for control can be from governance
committees, from agencies with the primary responsibility for
management, or from other sources (Holling and Meffe, 1996). It is
manifest in narrowly focused policies, lack of true stakeholder
input, and overly complicated governance.
In addition to the type of institutional complexities and scales of
controllability mentioned previously, there are other reasons that
can preclude experimentation. An important factor is the cost of
experimentation (Walters, 1997). Those costs can appear as direct
costs and include activities such as monitoring, data gathering,
analysis and evaluation of direct manipulations. Other costs can be
viewed as opportunity costs; the cost of using a resource for
manipulation rather than for another use. One such example is the
cost of experimental water releases from the Glen Canyon, but the
situation is very similar in the Missouri and Platte Rivers. Although
water releases from the Glen Canyon dam are required under the
Colorado Compact, water can be released through the turbines that
generate electrical energy or water can be released through by-pass
tubes. Water released for experimental purposes through the
by-pass tubes does not generate electrical revenue (or, in the other
examples, is not available for barge traffic, or the irrigation of
crops). Some estimates have been made of lost revenues on the
order of hundreds of thousands of dollars. In other words, this is an
example where the opportunity costs can be reasonably estimated,
and is high. One suggestion as to why a long term (multiple
decades) experimental plan could not be agreed upon for the Glen
Canyon adaptive management program was the proposed cost of
evaluation.
2.3. Surprises are suppressed
Surprises are expected in complex socialeecological systems,
perhaps especially when we attempt to anticipate them. Surprise
may come in the form of natural disaster (drought, hurricane), or
as a departure from anticipated human behaviors, or from other
sources. When surprises intervene in adaptive management
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programs, they should be embraced as opportunities to learn rather
than as externalities. Humans are poor at dealing with uncertainty
and surprise. Human response to an uncertain future driven by
anthropogenic stress is to attempt to anticipate that surprise,
and ‘mitigate’ it. Of course if surprise can be anticipated it is
unlikely to be surprising.
A focus of the Platte River Recovery Adaptive Management
Program (Smith, 2010) is to restore sandbar habitat for endangered
interior least terns (Sterna antillarum athalassos) and piping plovers
(Charadrius melodus). The potential management actions that
might meet the goal of habitat restoration include mechanical
movement of sand with heavy machinery and surge flows origi-
nating from releases from a reservoir upstream. Both management
actions are made more difficult due to the colonization of sandbars
by cottonwoods and other woody vegetation, which must be
removed before other management can occur. In the Platte River,
the historic structuring process was flooding. Even if the historic
hydrologic regime could be restored, the river would not respond
as before, because woody vegetation has armored the sandbars,
so that flooding is not likely to mobilize the islands. Thus, simply
restoring the former structuring process will not restore structure,
and woody vegetation has to be removed before flooding (surges)
can have an impact on habitat. This is an example of hysteresis,
“when the path in is different from the path out”. The Platte River
Recovery Program (and other stakeholders such as the Fish and
Wildlife Service and Nature Conservancy) understands this, and as
a result, are working to mechanically remove trees.
By the year 2000, an invasive wetland plant, the common reed
(Phragmites australis), had become established along the Platte
River, further entrenching the hysteresis caused by vegetative
stabilization of sandbars. This was a surprise in that it was unan-
ticipated, and that common reed’s invasion of shallow water and
moist habitats was nearly complete and extremely rapid. Flows of
the Platte were slowed, creating flooding and further altering the
river’s hydrology. Management of common reed was not included
in the Platte River Recovery Management Plan, and its rapid spread
throughout the river system created challenges. One of the initial
responses discussed by the Platte River Program Governance
Committee was to treat invasion by common reed as external, and
attempt to eradicate it and then continue with the planned adap-
tive management. Luckily, this did not happen and management of
this invasive species is being incorporated into the Platte River
Program adaptive management plan. However, that initial response
did receive serious consideration, and similar responses have
occurred elsewhere.
2.4. Prescriptions are followed
Adaptive management is prescriptive only in process, though
formally identifying objectives and alternative actions giving
support for one alternative or another is critical. However, if
management is seeking to optimize learning, then it is not possible
to anticipate every bifurcation possible following individual
experiments. Surprises, for example, as described above, are
opportunities for more than the usual amount of learning (and thus
“better” management). But the unanticipated can be less startling
than surprises, asmore andmore is learned about the system under
management, new information informs new management. This
new information can be noted and put away, and managers can
proceed with the adaptive management plan originally formulated,
or the plan can be reformulated. Adaptive management processes
that are too complex in their internal organization and too complex
and fragile in their stakeholder network are apt to stick to the
prescription nomatter what. After all, it can take years of process to
reach management agreements.
Although it is difficult to admit a lack of prescience, a good
adaptive management plan is likely to eventually make the adap-
tive management plan obsolete. This is actually a good thing,
and indicates that management has generated new knowledge.
That knowledge should be embraced, and adaptive management
plans should be revisited, dropped, and rewritten as a matter of
course.
2.5. Action procrastination: learning and discussion remain the
only ingredients
Process should not trump action, and the implementation of
what has been learned. Management is central in adaptive
management, but can be halted by calls for ‘more science’, which
often represents a stalling tactic. Many complex and difficult
environmental challenges have been left unaddressed for years by
hiding behind the need for more science. Although no action is in
fact a management action, in this case we are referring to situations
where action is desired but prevented by obstructionists to the
process. Such obstruction is often political in nature. Often, this
action procrastination leads to missed opportunities and more
intractable problems in the near future. Examples include climate
change and the management of salmon stocks in the western
United States. Lee (1993) provides additional examples.
2.6. Learning is not used to modify policy and management
Adaptive management can be used by politicians as a method to
placate stakeholders while continuing business as usual. This runs
counter to the basic tenets of adaptive management, whereby
management can proceed despite uncertainty as long as manage-
ment actions are designed to reduce that uncertainty over time.
This pathology is similar to the one described above, but here what
is learned is critical and important, but is shelved because the
management actions identified and necessary are too politically,
economically, or logistically difficult. Salmon management in the
Pacific Northwest is once again an example, where the manage-
ment objective is to conserve distinct stocks of salmons, and viable
populations of those stocks. Removal of dams would clearly benefit
salmon stocks, and indeed, for salmon runs blocked by dams, other
actions which may further aid salmon stocks may be trivial by
comparison.
2.7. Avoiding hard truths: decision makers are risk averse
It is possible to conduct small management experiments into
perpetuity while never tackling the critical but controversial
underlying management challenges. Here, the necessary manage-
ment is not known with surety, but it is likely that it is logistically
and politically difficult and expensive; or, the outcome is antici-
pated to be economically or politically expensive. To avoid hard
truths small-scale management experiments are conducted, which
may improve management and the state of the resource, around
the edges. Many large river adaptive management programs fall
into this category, and may focus on manipulations to improve
habitat rather than restoring processes e usually flooding and
hydrological variation.
Endangered species management can too fall into this trap. In
the management of critically endangered species, both risk (the
probability of a “bad” result) and uncertainty can be high (Fig. 2).
Where the risk is simply too great, adaptive management may not
be the strategy to employ, and managers should use other
approaches, though risk can be accounted for in decision making.
The California condor (Gymnogyps californianus), when the wild
population was reduced to a handful of individuals, was not a good
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candidate for adaptive management. For one, critical experiments
were too risky (such as attempting to establish a second pop-
ulation); additionally, critically endangered species are unlikely to
yield enough data in terms of sample size to actually assess the
success of management experiments. Ultimately, for this species,
the lowest risk path, removal of the population from the wild
and captive breeding, was taken. In cases such as this, a cautious
application of structured decision making can yield positive results
for the resource at stake (e.g., Rout et al., 2009; Tenhumberg et al.,
2004).
2.8. The process lacks leadership and direction
Stakeholders should not be decisionmakers, and no stakeholder
group should have more influence than others. Strong, but benef-
icent, leadership is critical, as is the ability to facilitate; facilitator
and leader can be separate roles. Too often a very vocal or influ-
ential individual, or stakeholder group, hijacks the process. This
can lead to a process to address a specific agenda other than
learning how to best manage. The adept leader of an adaptive
management effort should recognize the personalities involved
and make the best of all of them (Holling and Chambers, 1973), and
should recognize both blatant and hidden agendas. Appeasing
vociferous stakeholders will simply alienate the remaining stake-
holders and undermine the adaptive management process.
2.9. Focus on planning, not action
Large adaptive management programs can become stuck in
a planning loop. This can be due to a desire for perfection and
success, the mistaken belief that the adaptive management plan is
a panacea rather than a process andmust be perfect, or because the
funding or sponsoring agency wishes to keep the process in an
endless planning loop. Either is a serious pathology that must be
recognized and rectified. In some large adaptive management
programs, programmatic compartmentalization within bureau-
cracies may mean that there is plenty of funding available to
establish the process, or for monitoring, but not for experiments.
3. Summary
The conceptual underpinnings for adaptive management are
quite simple; there will always be inherent uncertainty in the
dynamics and behavior of complex ecologic systems. As a result
of the numeric complexity and non-linear interactions among
components, there will always be inherent unpredictability. The
genius of adaptive management lies in the continuing recognition
and confrontation of such uncertainty. Rather than assume uncer-
tainty away or use it to preclude management actions, adaptive
management can help foster resilience and flexibility to deal
with an uncertain future, and develop safe to fail designs that
acknowledge inevitable change and surprise.
The central argument of adaptive management is integrative
learning. That learning is fostered, not by trial and error, but by
a structured process, and reduces uncertainty in an iterative
process. This integrative learning is described in phases of
assessment, policy as hypotheses, management actions as tests,
and evaluation. Assessment phases of adaptive management
involve bounding issues, focusing on shared understanding of
policy relevant hypotheses and screening alternatives for testing.
In some resource assessments, a singular hypothesis can be
generally agreed upon for testing via management actions. In
many cases, multiple, competing hypotheses can be generated and
spawn a suite of activities; research, modeling, data collection and
adaptive management actions can all help sort among these
competing ideas.
The experiences of applying active adaptive management
however, have had mixed success. Adaptive assessments have
robustly transformed understanding and generated totally new
management schemes in many areas, such as in the Everglades
(Gunderson and Light, 2006) Grand Canyon (Walters, 1997).
Active adaptive management (designed to test or sort among
competing hypotheses) has failed in most large-scale applica-
tions. Successful adaptive management, defined as the ability to
plan, execute and evaluate experiments which in turn, lead to
new or revised management policies have occurred in a few
select programs, such as the Grand Canyon (Zellmer and
Gunderson, 2009). Programmatic failures have been a result of
a lack of ecological resilience, inability to control experimenta-
tion at appropriate scales, and the lack of flexibility, trust and
openness in the human management system (Gunderson and
Light, 2006).
The potential pitfalls in adaptive management, and the pathol-
ogies that can develop, have some commonalities. For one, the
process can be hijacked by those with specific agendas. The
agenda can be one associated with the specific management
issue at hand, or may simply represent bureaucratic pathology
whereby the adaptive management process is invoked to delay the
process of making hard decisions. There are some signs that can
indicate the process is failing, some glaringly obvious, some more
subtle. On the obvious front, making stakeholders cry by badgering
them during the process (witnessed by one of the authors) is a
telltale sign of process gone awry. If stakeholders all have
a different definition of adaptive management, there may be
a problem. If stakeholders claim they’ve been doing this all along,
there is probably a problem. If the managed resource continues to
degrade while the process is stuck in a discussion loop, there is
a problem. If no experimental management is occurring, there is no
adaptive management.
Adaptive assessment and management confronts the inherent
uncertainty of resource management systems and in doing so
intersects with the themes of this issue of the Journal of Envi-
ronmental Management. Scale should be explicitly defined, which
may be accomplished by developing an integrated ecosystem
model. The model is bounded in both spatial and temporal
domains, and can only minimally deal with larger, slower
processes and smaller, faster processes. This scale bounding is one
source of uncertainty in the assessment process. In the manage-
ment phase, limits in space and time are imposed by the ability of
managers to act within a system. Social networks that are
Fig. 2. Adaptive management is appropriate where the level of risk is relatively low,
where it is “safe” to conduct experiments.
C.R. Allen, L.H. Gunderson / Journal of Environmental Management 92 (2011) 1379e1384 1383
centered on epistemic communities and extend to stakeholder and
policy groups are developed in adaptive assessments and are
critical to successes and failures of implementation and manage-
ment (Gunderson, 1999). In spite of limitations, adaptive
management is a robust approach for dealing with complex
natural resource issues; from renewable resource harvest and use,
to pure conservation. Its focus on learning, integrating under-
standing and generation of novelty are as relevant now as decades
ago when it was developed. The adaptive management approach
can bridge gaps in understanding and create new and novel
approaches. Recognition of barriers will foster that development
and the application of a conceptually robust approach to solving
old problems.
4. Conclusions
Adaptive management is perhaps too often seen as the only
way forward for wicked socialeecological problems, such as pre-
sented by the management of stressed and over-appropriated
watersheds that transcend multiple jurisdictions (e.g., the Ever-
glades, the Colorado River, the Missouri River). These are not the
ideal situations for the application of adaptive management,
because replication is not possible and experiments are highly
constrained by entrenched management, engineering, economic
and social systems. In such situation, adaptivemanagement can be
seen as the action of last resort, and used to maintain the status
quo. We envision the most appropriate use for adaptive
management is not for such intractable social problems, but is
rather most appropriate and useful where a great deal of scientific
uncertainty exists, sufficient resources allow for experimentation
with multiple treatments, competing hypotheses are present but
finite and testable, and leadership that can overcome vested and
self serving stakeholders who are adept at preventing active
experimentation.
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